Proposed Amendments to the Egyptian Competition Law

February 26, 2026
News Updates

On 13 January 2026, the Government of Egypt (the “GoE”) proposed substantial amendments (the “Draft”) to the Egyptian Competition Law (the “ECL”) introducing a comprehensive overhaul of several aspects in the current regime to the Parliament in coordination with the Egyptian Competition Authority (“ECA”).

The Draft expand the law to 82 articles across seven chapters (introducing around 56 new articles). Below, we summarize the key highlights of the Draft:

A. Imposition of Administrative Sanctions and Aggravated Fines

i. Administrative Sanctions

Legal persons (e.g., companies) will be subject to administrative financial penalties to be directly imposed by the ECA without awaiting court judgement for such imposition.

The administrative financial penalties under the Draft for violations of Articles 6, 7, and 8 (vertical and horizontal restraints as well as abuse of dominance) are:

A minimum of 2% to a maximum of 15% of the gross revenues generated from the product subject of the violation, as opposed to the previous ranges of 1%-10% for abuse of dominance and vertical restraints cases and 2%-12% for horizontal restraints/cartels.
If such revenues cannot be calculated, the minimum range of the fine is proposed to increase from the incumbent EGP 100,000 (for abuse of dominance and vertical restraints) or EGP 500,000 (for horizontal restraints/cartels) to be EGP 1M, whereas the maximum range of the fine increases from EGP 300M (for abuse of dominance and vertical restraints) or 500M (for horizontal restraints/cartels) to EGP 2 billion.

This Draft has thus unified the fines’ threshold for the main violations under the ECL.

Furthermore, administrative sanctions to be imposed for gun jumping in cases of economic concentrations are proposed to range from 2% to 15% of total annual turnover or asset value of the parties to the transaction (instead of 2% to 12%).

The administrative fines imposed by the ECA will be collectible through administrative attachment procedures, which accelerates the collection process; grants them preferential rights; and provides the ECA with wider enforcement powers.

Last, the Draft sets out detailed criteria that the ECA must consider when determining fines, including:

gravity and duration of the violation;
nature of the infringing activity;
revenues generated or asset value;
manner in which the violation occurred and surrounding circumstances;
recidivism;
voluntary corrective actions and compliance initiatives; and
the violating party’s ability to pay.

The Draft also granted the ECA the discretion to reduce penalties based on the timing and extent of cooperation, including early remediation and removal of anticompetitive effects.

However, for natural persons responsible for the actual management, they remain subject to the criminal fines’ regime, which requires a criminal court to issue fines. The ECA’s administrative sanctions could also be challenged before the competent court.

ii. Aggravated Criminal Fines

a. Violations of Articles 6, 7, or 8 of the ECL

In case of violation of Article 6, a criminal fine not less than EGP 1M and not in excess of EGP 200M will be imposed on every natural person who has participated in the commission of this violation.

Furthermore, a criminal fine not less than EGP 500,000 and not in excess of EGP 100M will be imposed on natural persons who have participated in the commission of the practices prescribed under Articles 7 and 8 of the ECL.

These fines can be doubled in case of recidivism.

b. ECA’s Corrective Decisions

A fine ranging from EGP 1M to EGP 100M for failure to comply with the ECA’s decisions relating to corrective measures or interim measures in cases of vertical or horizontal restraints as well as abuse of dominance. These fines can be doubled in case of recidivism.

c. Prevention of ECA from Exercising its Mandate

A criminal fine not less than EGP 500,000 and not more than EGP 100M will be imposed on those who prevent ECA members from exercising their activities.

d. Failure to Submit Data to the ECA

A criminal fine not less than 0.25% and not more than 1% of the total annual turnover will be imposed on those who do not provide the information requested by the ECA in the course of reviewing complaints regarding monopolistic practices and reviewing economic concentrations. In case of difficulty assessing the total turnover, a criminal fine not less than EGP 200K and not more than EGP 50M shall apply.

e. Intentional Submission of False Data to the ECA

A criminal fine not less than 0.5% and not more than 1% of the total annual turnover will be imposed on those who intentionally submit false data or documents or information to the ECA. In case of difficulty assessing the total turnover, a criminal fine not less than EGP 300K and not more than EGP 50M shall apply.

f. Breaching Confidentiality by ECA’s Personnel

A criminal fine not less than EGP 500K and not more than EGP 5M shall apply on ECA’s Personnel (including the Chairman and ECA’s board) in case of violating the confidentiality obligation imposed on them regarding cases reviewed by the ECA.

B. Introduction of New Fines

The Draft introduces additional fines aimed at facilitating the ECA’s information gathering powers, including:

Failure to appear before the ECA: A fine ranging from EGP 20,000 to EGP 250,000 for unjustified failure to appear before the ECA when duly requested and where attendance is necessary for the performance of its duties.
Failure to comply with Decrees on Pricing of Commodities: A fine ranging from EGP 100K to EGP 5M for failure to comply with the Cabinet’s decisions on setting the prices of certain commodities for a period of time.

C. Expansion of the Scope of Anti-Competitive Practices

i. Horizontal and Vertical Restraints

Unlike the current regime, the prohibited conduct will no longer be limited to agreements but will also include all practices including all means of communications, even if it did not rise to the level of agreement but would practically lead to the alignment of their market behaviore.g., a concerted practice.

At the same time, the Draft expanded the scope of the ex-ante exemption regime of certain agreements to include vertical restraints as opposed to horizontal ones only in the current law. In these cases, prior to the conclusion of an agreement, the ECL may approve certain horizontal or vertical agreements that may appear restrictive if they generate clear technical or economic benefits for consumers.

ii. Abuse of Dominance

Regarding abuse of dominance, the Draft introduces an explicit prohibition of resale price maintenance, thereby prohibiting agreements or practices that restrict a party’s ability to set resale prices independently or impose a minimum resale price, while explicitly excluding maximum or recommended resale prices from the scope of prohibition.

D. Redefinition of Dominance

The Draft introduces updated definitions aligned, particularly with respect to dominance. A dominant position will be presumed in either of the following cases: (i) when a person holds 50% or more of the relevant market, unless the concerned person proves lack of market power, or (ii) when the person has the ability to exercise effective influence over prices or output (i.e., existence of market power).

E. Grievance Committee and Leniency Regime

The Draft establishes an independent grievance committee, chaired by a senior judge.

This committee shall review challenges against ECA’s decisions. However, ECA decisions will be immediately enforceable, unless a court orders otherwise.

Regarding the leniency regime, the Draft now grants immunity or reductions of penalty to the first party to report cartel conduct or vertical restraints. The Draft introduces a general rule to ensure the confidentiality of whistleblowers’ identities in case the disclosure of their identity entails exposing them to risks or harm resulting from whistleblowing. The mechanism for the application of such confidentiality provision shall be determined in the executive regulations.

F. Enhanced Independence of the Egyptian Competition Authority

The Draft provides that the ECA shall become an independent regulatory authority with public legal personality, subordinated to the President of Egypt, instead of the Prime Minister under the current regime.

The ECA’s Board of Directors will be empowered to impose administrative financial penalties directly on legal entities, without awaiting court judgments.